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REPORTING LIVE FROM. . .:
Planning Principles for War in the
Information Age

A Monograph
by
Major Kevin C. M. Benson
Armor



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School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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
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
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ABSTRACT

REPORTING LIVE FROM...: Planning Principles for War in the Information Age by MAJ Kevin C.M. Benson, USA, 67 pages.

The media covered the war in the Gulf. Every press conference was monitored in Washington, Riyadh, and Baghdad. The free press is guaranteed by the Constitution the Armed Forces swear to uphold and defend. The press is also a business that both serves and is beholden to the public. Campaigns of the future will protect American vital interests, as opposed to ensuring national survival. Campaigns protecting American interests require the sustained support of the American public and Congress; this support is developed and maintained through the media. The framework for addressing this challenge must be in place prior to battle. This monograph seeks to answer the question: What principles should guide the operational level commander's media campaign realizing that the media transmits the story of the campaign?

The monograph begins with a separate examination of military and public affairs theory. The criteria used as a basis for discussion throughout the monograph are derived from public affairs theory and applied to several historical events that occurred during the two campaigns presented in the history section of the monograph. The campaigns, Grant's final campaign in Northern Virginia, and Operation Desert Storm, were conducted under intense media scrutiny and offer the best means of discerning possible planning principles.

The conclusion presents three proposed planning principles for operational and public affairs staffs. These three: Planning, Anticipation, and Objective, can serve as aids to judgment in planning for war in the media age. These principles, or others like them must be incorporated into public affairs doctrine. Operations officers must consider the media environment. Public Affairs officers must expand their involvement in the planning process. These principles will assist in this effort.

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INTRODUCTION

*Dick...quick...turn on the TV...the war started!*¹

On 2 August 1990 the dawn came up like thunder in the Emirate of Kuwait. The massed armor and heliborne forces of Iraq overwhelmed the tiny Kuwaiti defense force and launched a crisis that commanded the world's attention. The world watched the war on television, live as it was happening. The pervasive reach of the mini-camera and satellite hook-up had a profound impact on policy-makers, civilian and military.

CNN covered the war in the Gulf from Washington, Riyadh, Dhaharan, and Baghdad. The early and continuing concern of civilian and military policy-makers was the influence constant TV coverage would have on the American public's support of military action. Questions of operational security, censorship, press pools, and access arose. The destruction caused by the air operations raised questions of proportionality. Deception operations raised the hackles of the press as they saw themselves as players in that operation. These are just a few issues that arose during the war. Electronic and print media covered them all. The influence of television and news reporting has further implications for the planner and the wars of the 21st century. The operational level commander needs principles to guide his media campaign in the next century. This monograph seeks

those principles.

The fundamental concept in this quest is the linkage of the government, the army, and the people. Clausewitz called this the paradoxical trinity and asserted that a bond must be formed between each part of the trinity for successful policy. A similar notion of trinity also arises in public relations theory, substituting a business and a product for the government and the army. The trinity concept provides a model to analyze how well such principles further policy and the strength of the bonds in the trinity. Future campaigns operate in and respond to a media environment.

The campaigns of the future will defend vital American interests abroad rather than our survival interests. These campaigns will depend upon a national policy that enjoys the sustained support of Congress and the American people. The Army role in sustaining support is building confidence in American arms as an instrument of policy. This means the planners of these campaigns must consider not only media presence during the conduct of the campaign, but also the influence of the media coverage on the campaign. The planner must determine access for the media during the campaign. He translates the goals of the campaign into information objectives for the public, which media coverage conveys. The operational commander and his staff must answer a series

of issues about public support and media presence prior to executing the campaign. They must also bear in mind the campaigns of the future extend into the air waves of the world through the electronic media.

The operational planner must recognize the impact and influence that the media exerts on operations. The nature of warfare now includes an information deluge responding to a thirst for news on the part of the American people. The media quenches that thirst by transmitting the story of the campaign to the people. The media, however, also responds to the pressures of the news business; their product must sell papers and commercial time. The operational planner must balance the competing pressures of: operational security, media access, information objectives, public demand for news, and the influence of news on public support. The planner, therefore, needs principles to assist him in balancing these competing requirements. The operator and planner need to work with the media, and recognize its operating needs.

The necessary criteria for sorting through operational media planning questions is available in public relations theory. These criteria, addressed in detail in the body of the monograph, focus on problem identification, resolution, action, and evaluation. Stated in an operational perspective, the criteria

address four phases: 1] Current operational situation; 2] Planned response to the situation, along with branches and sequels; 3] Execution; and 4] Evaluation & feedback phase. These simple phases and corresponding questions form a key part of this monograph's straightforward methodology.

To discern either the presence or lack of planning principles for media operations the monograph begins with a separate examination of military and public relations theory, followed by a review of American military doctrine. The monograph then reviews the adjunct media activities of two historical campaigns. A critical analysis, using the theory, doctrine, and history, distills appropriate principles for the operational planner. Conclusions and recommendations, based upon the descriptions, discussion, and analysis, complete the monograph.

The link between the government, the army, and the people forms the cornerstone of military theory, the Clausewitzian trinity. The idea of a trinity is a common thread in both military and public relations theory. The information age binds the policy questions of the Clausewitzian trinity to the communications trinity, energizing both. Each trinity acts to challenge the planner. The quest for doctrinal principles begins by reviewing military and public relations theory.

MILITARY THEORY

War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.²

Clausewitz, the pre-eminent philosopher of war, observed that any military theory must maintain a balance between the "remarkable trinity" of the actions of the government, the army, and the people, in order to be useful.³ The successful prosecution of war requires the interrelated actions of: the government, as the policy making body; the army, as the executor of that policy; and the people, as the supporters of the government, policy, and army. The linkage between the three primary elements of the trinity proposed by Clausewitz provides the basis for understanding policy and military operations in support of policy.

Wise policy in the government of a democratic society is the means to a stable relationship of the trinity. The government "sells" its policy to the people and their representatives. The government derives its powers from the people; therefore, policy must meet the needs of the people or the government loses support. The Clausewitzian trinity suggests the government plays the role of the director of policy, defining the national interests and building consensus for the application of power to reach national objectives. Government in our democracy expands this role based upon the checks and

balances established by the Constitution. The policy proposed by the executive branch requires majority support within the legislative branch and, if challenged, favorable constitutional review by the judicial branch. The Clausewitzian requirement is nonetheless fulfilled as the entire government plays the directing role and provides the brake on the tendency for war to go to the extreme.

The people play a significant role in the balance of the trinity, both as a check to action and in support of policy. The people, through their representatives, play the role of a check on governmental actions. Policy must meet their needs or it receives no popular support. Its goals require clear and timely explanation, otherwise the people will not see the need for the it and fail to support it, thereby depriving the trinity of the will to fight. Wise policy stabilizes the trinity.

The army role in "selling" the government policy is limited to building confidence in itself as an instrument of power. Building confidence in the Army is a direct result of good training and preparation properly shown to the public. Clausewitz tells us, "The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching *is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time* [original italics]."⁴

The army trains for and anticipates combat operations in support of national interests, established by policy.

Prepared military forces enhance deterrence and support policy objectives. If given access and accurate responses, the media will communicate our military capability to the public. The military fulfills its supporting role to government policy by training soldiers and commanders that can perform their mission in the execution of operations and by instilling confidence in its ability.⁵ To support consensus the Army need only let its actions speak for themselves. Building confidence is as important as effective training. As the military explains its role to the people in any forum, it needs to communicate its activities, training, and readiness as an instrument of policy.

Clausewitz wrote that war is an extension of policy, indeed it is an instrument of deliberate government policy.⁶ It retains the supreme position in war planning, as Clausewitz wrote, "Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument..."⁷ War must be fully in consonance with policy, just as the policy must outline the objectives that war will attain. Just as the nature of war and the means of war undergo change constantly, the nature of policy also undergoes change that can directly affect the execution of war. Change affects the balance within the trinity necessary for the

conduct of war.

The passions of the people and their support for policy require a foundation of trust in government and the army as a sharp instrument. The Army needs to keep public confidence as a prerequisite condition. Thus the resort to war as an instrument of policy and its goals require explanation to the people. Indeed, the government in a democracy must openly explain the political steps that identify that which is worth going to war over, and the steps taken to avoid war. Clausewitz wrote that it is the aim of policy, "to unify and reconcile all aspects of internal administration,"^a and policy is the trustee for the interests of the elements of the trinity. The people provide the passion for war, as Clausewitz wrote. Trust in government is fleeting if the people are not convinced of the justness of its' policy or the readiness of its' army.

The trinity itself is only as strong as the links between government, army, and people. The links between the parts of the trinity are fostered through communication. The failure to communicate the need for war as an instrument of policy could result in untimely use of military power or prevent the use of the instrument altogether. Understanding how to communicate policy is as important as understanding how to make policy. Public relations theory provides the method for

asking the correct questions about communicating the objectives of policy and campaigns to the people, just as military theory provides the army the questions to answer in the course of planning campaigns.

PUBLIC RELATIONS THEORY

Today a communicator must consider...planning persuasive strategies.⁹

Public relations theory explains the relationship between an organization, the public, and communicating the organization's goals to the public. It predicts the ability to communicate goals and generate support for those goals also, providing a basis for principles that guide action. Public relations theory is the science of communicating ideas from organizations to people, selling products, and forming opinions or behavior favorable to organizational goals.

The medium of exchange within public relations is information communicated between an organization and its public. The object of the exchange is to persuade or sell, creating opinions that support a specific product or idea. Information in one form flows out of the organization and different information comes back in as a measure of public opinion.

Just as Mao likened the people to the ocean in which the guerilla swims, public opinion is the ocean,

the psychological and political operating environment, in which the organization swims. Scott M. Cutlip, a public relations theorist, defines public opinion as, "the sum of accumulated individual opinions on an issue in public debate and affecting a group of people."¹⁰

Organizations prosper or fall dependent upon their responses to and fostering of public opinion about their primary products, policies, or goals.¹¹ Since the public buys products they recognize and prefer, the operational objective of an organization's public relations campaign is sustained public support for its product or organizational goals. A military example of such a campaign is the annual Combined Federal Campaign [CFC] drive.

The annual CFC fund drive is a part of Army life. Although it is conducted in a closed military society, the campaign uses persuasive communications to build social pressure to contribute to a good cause. The pattern of the campaign is fairly standard. The CFC goal is advertised as the unit's goal. The Commanding General, [CG], makes the first donation with appropriate fanfare. The CG appoints a chairman who further tasks every subordinate unit for a key-person for the unit drive. This brings the campaign into every office and orderly room, increasing pressure to contribute. The weekly progress of the campaign is prominently displayed

on a thermometer or other sign near the main gate of the post. The campaign uses persuasive means and goals to raise money. The campaign's persuasive means target soldier opinion, just like companies target public opinion.

Public opinion is not as fickle as it seems. Cutlip tells us, "if people in a democracy are provided...ready access to information, public opinion reveals a hard-headed commonsense." Our premise can be that actions speak for themselves. As long as our actions are in accord with our stated goals, accurate reports will appeal to basic common sense. The more enlightened the public is about events, such as an engagement within a campaign, the more likely the public will agree with, "objective opinions of realistic experts."¹² The free flow of information works for this basic common sense; controlled information flow, essentially a closed system of information, will not. When military actions are not appropriate to policy goals, words cannot explain away the discrepancy. Communicating for national will is an open system in a democracy.

The open systems model of public relations theory is based upon a free flow of information. [See Figure 1]¹³ As the figure shows, the model proposes a trinity of sorts between the organization, the public, and the

OPEN SYSTEMS MODEL OF PUBLIC RELATIONS




Figure 1

desired relationship between the organization and its public. The utility of the trinity, as in the Clausewitzian trinity, comes from an understanding of the poles of the trinity. The organization is an organization, such as the Army, that deals with and has as its goal a desired relationship with a public.

The organization must define their public and how their activities are seen to focus their information effort. The system bases its utility on the interaction of the organization and its' public. These publics, as Cutlip says, are those, "involved with and affected by or affect[ing] the organization."¹⁴ The organization must study the public it needs to deal with, identifying the public's needs and requirements. It must also maintain contact with its publics to analyze how its actions are perceived and anticipate changes in public needs or perceptions.

In the Open Systems model communication-the flow of information-is two way, between the organization and its public. The resulting information exchange causes modifications to positions on all sides of the trinity.¹⁵ For example, during Operation Desert Shield/Storm the initial press briefing officers were majors. These competent staff officers did not appear comfortable dealing with the media, nor did they have the rank or detailed knowledge of high level decisions to appear

credible to the public. The modification made was the use of flag rank officers, who were credible, to brief the press and, through these press briefings, the nation. The credibility of the speaker in information exchange formed the basis for this element of the communications strategy. The activities were suitable to stated policy, but making corporate leaders spokesmen improved communications.

Using the Open Systems model of public relations requires the formulation of communications strategy based on organization goals and information exchange. The organization "shares" information with the public. Cutlip advises organizational leaders that shared information maintains contact with the public, and when necessary leaders use this form of contact, "for solving rather than explaining away problems."¹⁶ The military terms in public affairs theory embody similar concepts to their military theory sources.

Public relations theory borrows the term strategy from the military. Cutlip describes business and communications strategy as plans for the management and deployment of a firm's resources to take advantage of business opportunities and to surprise and surpass competitors. Corporate strategy depends as much on the synchronization of communications, production and sales as the military depends upon the synchronization of fires

and maneuver. Business strategy formulation requires attention to detail and discipline equal to military strategy, and uses similar processes.¹⁷

Formulating a communications strategy uses a Four-Step Public Relations Process. The process [see figure 2] defines a disciplined approach to communications strategy development, implementation, and assessment. The process requires preparation of resources, anticipation of actions and reactions, and focused objectives. Strategy development involves steps 1 and 2. Step 1 defines the situation, as shown it essentially determines what's happening now. The organization's intelligence requirement, similar to the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, defines this region laying the base for step 2. Step 2 determines why and what the organization should do. This step requires planning and programming, the basis for the organization's strategy, and is akin to the development of military courses of action. The completion of these steps leads to implementation of the strategy.

Implementation of the strategy involves action and communication. Anticipation of needs guides implementation. Action sends its own message. Actions involve all the steps the organization takes to accomplish its goals with respect to the target publics. Communication to the public should complement the

FOUR - STEP PUBLIC RELATIONS PROCESS




Figure 2

messages of action. Communications involves the two way information exchange between public and organization, determining how the organization acts, how those acts are seen, and how it explains its actions. The information exchange provides a means to discover how actions and communication were received.

The final step of the process evaluates not only the results of the strategy but the effectiveness of the planning and programming that preceded action. As a result of information exchange the organization alters its program or concludes it. When the organization achieves its objective, it assesses the situation and develops subsequent objectives. The public relations staff of the organization participates in the development of plans and programs for the entire organization, and its involvement is essential to organization policy.¹⁰

The preceding reviews of military and public relations theory suggest a basis for action to support the information goals of policy. Principles derived from theory, as a basis for action and questions to ask during planning, evolve into doctrine. Army doctrine, and in the case of public affairs an Army Regulation, combine in an attempt to incorporate principles as guidelines for military actions.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS DOCTRINE

I sympathize strongly with your position...caught between the top brass...and a press corps...¹⁹

Principles derived from theory form the essence of doctrine. Our Army's doctrine expresses our approach to fighting our nation's campaigns, operations, and battles. Our doctrine is based upon theory and principles tested over time that provide the guidance to fight and the adaptability to take advantage of advances in technology.²⁰ The foundation of all doctrine begins with Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, and specifically for public affairs doctrine, to Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations, and Army Regulation 360-5, Public Information.

Joint Publication 1 addresses the armed forces as a whole, providing broad concepts to guide the application of joint combat power. Joint Publication 1, [Joint Pub 1], also addresses the nature of war in the information age citing the rapid growth of technology and the speed of communications as accelerators to crises.²¹ War in the information age requires an armed forces ready for action quickly and prepared to face its inherent restrictions and constraints.

The Armed Forces of the United States are responsible to the people for their defense and wise use

of force in their name. While the people will demand information about the armed forces during times of crisis, the armed forces require operational security to accomplish their mission. Joint Pub 1 states, "Sophisticated information technology and the nature of modern news reporting...make the tasks of ensuring operational security and surprise more difficult." The publication stresses the requirement to train both forces and public affairs activities under realistic conditions.²² The publication also stresses the requirement to communicate the goals of policy to the people. The armed forces must balance the need for security with the requirement to inform the people.

Joint Pub 1 states directly that the informational effort of a military operation is, "crucial to the success of any contemporary military operation, because it involves the support of the American people..."²³ Theory, both military and public relations, avers that the support of the people is a key element in the ability to execute a policy or program. The military is also accountable to the people; as Joint Pub 1 states, the Armed Forces must deal openly with the representatives of the free press. Since the press transmits the message of the Armed Forces to the people, the Armed Forces must balance the demands for information and the need for security in a responsible manner.²⁴ As Joint Pub 1

outlines the broad statements of responsibility for the military, the Army field manuals and regulations state more specific guidelines for action. The delineation of staff responsibilities is outlined in Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.

Field Manual 101-5 clearly outlines the responsibilities of the Public Affairs Officer, PAO. The PAO's responsibilities range from executing and supervising PA actions, briefing soldiers about the Privacy Act, and anticipating soldier information needs, to performing as the command spokesman to the media and ensuring logistic support of the media.²⁵ The most important responsibility of the PAO involves advising the commander on the PA impact of operations.

FM 101-5 stipulates that the PAO must advise the commander of the public affairs impact inherent in operations. The stipulation does not go any further, leaving this statement to be interpreted by individual officers. The scope of this task is wide, ranging from "how would this play in Peoria?" to the perception of friendly and enemy capabilities, and finally to the impact of televising the effects of battle on public support. The FM does not further specify guidance or tasks subordinate to the general task. A review of the pertinent Army regulation does not provide any further help.

Army Regulation 360-5, Public Information, contains the stated Department of Defense and Army principles for public information planning. The regulation prescribes:

- a. Public information objectives, principles, and procedures.
- b. Policies and procedures on review, clearance, and release of information to the public.
- c. Authority and responsibility to plan and conduct public information activities.²⁶

The public information principles provide a general framework for Army PAOs on what kind of information can be released, essentially any unclassified information. The PAO reviews other information for operational security. "Bad news" will be released as well as "good news" as candor is essential in relations with the media. The regulation specifies the techniques for such events as media days, handling military accidents, press releases for such accidents, and procedures for photographing personnel in hostile areas. The framework established by the regulation contains, essentially, a list of techniques and procedures for the PAO function. These useful checklists do not provide the necessary guidance for the changing information requirements of the public in the post-industrial age described in Joint Pub 1.

The information age requires both the PAO tasks

and a more visionary role. The Army regulation covers primarily techniques and procedures, basically what to do and how to do it. Neither FM 101-5 nor the Army regulations elaborate on public affairs principles to assist the commander or his PAO in reaching beyond the technique and procedures level. Joint Pub 1 points to a greater need for media awareness in the operational plan and adjunct media plan.

Theory describes the essential tie between the government, the people, and the army. The people of a democracy must support policy, and the army must ensure the public requirement for information is met. While theory and joint foundation doctrine suggest a greater need to understand public support and media influence in military planning, they do not provide the intellectual tools to design information objectives. The PAO and operations staff must think in terms of military operations in the media age and give life to the requirement of FM 101-5 to advise and inform the commander of the public affairs impact inherent in combat operations.

A look at the public affairs impact inherent in combat is the next step in the effort to answer the research question. Historical campaigns conducted in an age of communications and an aggressive media provide the seeds of operational public affairs doctrine. Grant's

Virginia campaign of the Civil War saw an increase in the access of the media to the battlefield and to instant communications in the form of the telegraph. Political and military leaders of the time often received information of a battle from the press before the field commanders reported. The second campaign, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, was conducted under the glare of klieg lights and television mini-cams. In both campaigns the commanders had the requirement to prepare their forces, anticipate enemy actions, and translate policy goals into objectives that were successful at home as well as on the battlefield. Each of these campaigns contains events from which principles may be derived through the use of theoretical questions.

HISTORICAL CAMPAIGNS

the detailed presentation of a historical event...make it possible to deduce a doctrine...²⁷

On 11 May 1864 LTG U.S. Grant sent a telegram to MG Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army. Grant described the series of hard battles fought from the Wilderness to Spotsylvania Courthouse. He summed up his determination to continue to fight against Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, writing, "I am now sending back...all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."²⁸ The last line of the telegram was immediately released by the Lincoln administration in a demonstration of the effort to defeat the South. This last campaign against Lee was conducted against a background of economic turmoil, public unrest, and a presidential campaign Lincoln felt he would lose. Lincoln needed victory. The press reported every move on and off the battlefield. The attention of the nation was on Grant and the Army of the Potomac.

As general-in-chief, Grant directed the efforts of all Union armies. In a series of letters and telegrams, Grant instructed the commanders of the various Union armies to focus on the offensive and bring unrelenting pressure on the Confederate armies. The central theater of war was northern Virginia where the Army of the Potomac opposed Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.

Grant faced Lee and needed to gain a victory. The road to the final victory began in the Wilderness.

The Battle of the Wilderness was the first confrontation between Grant and Lee. The battle was bloody and inconclusive; it was not a decisive victory. Previous battles ended with the withdrawal of the Union army, but this time Grant advanced. A Union soldier wrote this was the most thrilling moment of the war as his column reached the Chancellorsville crossroads and turned south.²⁹ Grant demonstrated his determination to fight with continuous combat and the press communicated that determination as they reported his activities.

The basic pattern of the campaign began in the Wilderness, Grant seeking to turn the Confederate flank and Lee countering the Union marches with marches of his own. Grant began to stretch Lee's army while marching toward Richmond. Lee turned the war into an attritional battle as he could not face the Union army in the field in a war of maneuver. Lee could only hold on. Lee recognized this fact and his need to destroy Grant, telling Jubal Early, "We must destroy this army of Grant's before it gets to the James River. If he gets there it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of time."³⁰ Lee could not destroy Grant's army, and the siege he foresaw lasted until the final pursuit to Appomattox in April 1865.

Grant marched, Lee counter-marched, the two fought, dug in, and marched again. Grant retained the initiative in the campaign, forcing Lee to react to the Army of the Potomac. The constant battle wore the Army of Northern Virginia down to a hard shell, until it became brittle and broke under the blows of the Union Army. Lee, the master of the offense, was not allowed to attack. Grant pursued victory, and his actions spoke for themselves.

Grant's stated object of fighting it [the battle] out along a line all summer produced jubilant headlines throughout the North.³¹ Grant's continued battles to gain victory raised public support until the cost in casualties began to erode that support. From 5-12 May 1864 the Army of the Potomac lost more casualties than all other Union armies combined in any other week of the entire war. With these casualties in mind, Lincoln reminded Grant that the time might come when, "the spirits and resources of the people would become exhausted."³²

The casualties also influenced the economy as well as public support. As public confidence in the war rose, the gold price fell. The price of gold dropped as confidence in the dollar soared. The tremendous casualties of the campaign had the opposite effect on the gold price.³³ Prices rose. Since the dollar was tied to

gold, this rise in prices decreased the buying power of the public thereby adding to the downward spiral of public morale. The casualty lists and economy also inflamed the political situation in the North.

The military situation clearly affected the political situation. Near the end of 1864, the South realized if she could hold out the North might vote in a Peace Democrat and the war would end. Lee wrote to Longstreet, saying during the upcoming battles the South would resist "manfully," fighting to throw Grant back so "he [Grant] will not be able to recover...his morale until the Presidential election is over, and then we shall have a new President to treat with."³⁴ Grant was, therefore, under pressure to produce a victory to shore up the flagging political position of Lincoln. Grant's armies did produce that victory, and Lincoln was re-elected.

Grant's overall directives to all Union armies set the conditions for victory, and rebuilt confidence within the Army of the Potomac. Soldiers transmitted this confidence home in letters. This public confidence in the military ensured political victory for Lincoln, and ultimately military victory for the North. Public support, a confident army, and a strong policy were interrelated, thereby producing a positive effect on the battle field. Professor Herman Hattaway summed up how

Lincoln and Grant sustained public support in one phrase, saying, "They [Lincoln and Grant] gave the people victory."³⁵ Clear policy, a competent armed force, and ultimately victory also sustained public support during the Gulf War of 1991.

Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. From the moment of invasion basic American policy contained four points; 1] Iraq must leave Kuwait, 2] the Kuwaiti government must be restored, 3] stability must return to the region, and 4] American lives in the region must be protected. These four fundamental points remained the lodestone for American military and diplomatic action. The policy announced by the President remained fixed and the Department of Defense translated it into military strategy. The President sold this policy to the American people by word and deed through the media.

The President and his spokesmen gained initial public support through raising a coalition, thereby showing the people America was not acting alone. These political actions established the justness of the cause and the wisdom of the President's actions in the eyes of the American people. The military supported the President's policy by demonstrating the combat readiness and professionalism that appeared capable of fulfilling that policy.

The proliferation of news media and news gathering

technology flooded the airwaves with the big story. News conferences were broadcast, reporters showed troops, planes, and ships leaving for the war zone. In Saudi Arabia, reporters visited troop units, showing their life in the desert and an understated professionalism, the dearth of bravado, as the date of the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal approached. The image of American soldiers in the desert came home to the people of America, moreso than during the Vietnam War. The people saw a trained, competent armed force ready for battle. Chairman Powell summed up the message for the troops during a visit in December 1990. His message to the troops was simple, "Be ready for war."³⁶ Soldiers and public were prepared and confident.

The units America sent to the Gulf were ready for war. The units trained hard during peacetime at the Combat Training Centers, centers that simulated real combat with laser devices and stressed all combat systems from maneuver to casualty evacuation. The images sent back from the Gulf through the media were images of hardened soldiers living a tough life and prepared for battle. The people were convinced of the competence and capabilities of their soldiers. The image of ready armed forces was sent home by the media and understood by the people.

The media also transmitted the images of victory.

The air operations rivetted the attention of America and the world. Precision munitions were just that, hitting precisely the point of the target. The wounded that were interviewed demonstrated patience, telling reporters they knew their units would take care of them, they were family. The long lines of tanks and armored vehicles rolling through the desert conveyed an image of unstoppable power, just as the long lines of Iraqi prisoners reinforced the image of victory. Even the Iraqi broadcasts of captured airmen did not adversely influence public support, indeed the opposite was true. People called for stern measures against the Iraqis for violating the laws of war. Victory, and the image of overwhelming power, sustained and reinforced the public support of the war in the Gulf.³⁷

The power of the image of war is the thread of continuity in both the historical campaigns presented. In the Civil War, the image was transmitted in the written word and through the lens of Matthew Brady. The rapid movement of mail by rail and news by telegraph brought a sense of immediacy to the Civil War, unlike any previous American war.³⁸ In the Gulf War the written word was always accompanied by photographs, but it was the television camera that really made an impact on the image of war. Many of the transmissions were live, therefore America witnessed action as it happened. The

camera traced the descent of the SCUD, the ascent of the Patriot, and the resulting flash/bang of impact. Images exerted an influence on the conduct of war.

The conduct of war is the planner's domain. Sustaining public support in the face of the instant transmission of images demands informational objectives established prior to conflict, and evaluated during conflict. Theory provides questions to ask when viewing experience. History provides factual, if vicarious, experience. Critical analysis, using theory and history, will reveal principles that will guide action, the basis for doctrine.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Critical analysis... is nothing but thinking that should precede the action.³⁹

The object of critical analysis is the application of theoretical questions to historical events to establish, as Clausewitz writes, "aids to judgement."⁴⁰ The theoretical questions used are derived from public relations theory, presented earlier, and modified to more readily fit into the operational planning realm. The questions and phases of the planning cycle represent a continuous process.

As stated earlier, the phases of the planning model are problem identification, problem resolution, action, and evaluation. These phases and attendant questions applied to events that occurred during the previously discussed historical campaigns will result in principles or aids to judgment for the operational level planner and commander facing combat action in the media age. The events selected are Early's advance on Washington, D.C. in 1864, the SCUDS of Desert Storm, and the bombing of the Iraqi command bunker during Desert Storm. The Early advance on Washington presented Grant with a significant problem during his final campaign.

Shortly after his appointment as lieutenant general, Grant persuaded Lincoln to allow him to remove the bulk of the forces guarding Washington adding these

regiments to the Army of the Potomac. Addition of these forces allowed Grant to begin operations with sufficient strength for continuous action against Lee. The situation in 1864 was a strong Union army disposed about Petersburg, and a reduced garrison in Washington. Early took advantage of this lack of force.

LTG Jubal Early advanced on Washington hoping to relieve pressure on the Petersburg front. As LTG [then MG] Sheridan wrote,

Early's audacity in thus threatening Washington had caused some concern to the officials in the city, but as the movement was looked upon by General Grant as a *mere foray which could have no decisive issue*, the Administration was not much disturbed till the Confederates came in close proximity.⁴¹

The arrival of Early and his forces at the fortifications guarding Washington forced Grant to divert first one division, then the entire VI Corps from his army, along with the XIX Corps to reinforce the city.⁴² These were unplanned responses forcing Grant to further plan a reorganization of effort in the greater Washington region.

The strike toward Washington late in the war filled the newspapers and policy-makers with alarm. Grant diverted his attention from the Petersburg front to address these concerns. His response to the Lincoln administration was to nominate MG Sheridan as commander

of the forces in the Shenandoah with the mission of removing Confederate forces, guarding this approach to Washington, and denying the regions' resources from the South.⁴³ The end result was an effective reorganization of effort under Grant's overall control and a reassurance of the Lincoln administration about the safety of the capital. Concern for the safety of the capital and a threat directed toward it caused a diversion of resources.

Another "mere foray," the SCUD attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel caused a similar diversion of resources and attention during the Gulf War. On 17 January 1991 Iraq launched its first SCUD missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia.

The SCUDS were militarily inconsequential due to their primitive guidance system and low warhead weight. They were, however, a terror weapon whose impact was magnified as world wide TV audiences observed the resulting explosions live. Hunting for the mobile SCUD launchers became a massive, if unplanned, part of the Allied air operation.

Resolution of the problem came about by using all elements of power. The US dispatched the deputy secretary of state to Israel, along with US manned and operated Patriot anti-missile defense batteries. The US speeded up delivery of Patriots to Israel's own defense

forces. The Allied air forces diverted many sorties to the SCUD hunting missions, TIME magazine reported, "Nearly half the sorties flown in the first two weeks of the war were assigned to anti-Scud missions. That had not been part of the allied air plan."⁴⁴

Actions taken and evaluation of the actions continued until the cease-fire. The Allied air forces continued to fly combat missions hunting SCUDS. The SCUDS may have been militarily inconsequential, but the influence of TV coverage made them a weapon of power. The Allies did not plan to divert as much combat power as they did in the counter SCUD effort, nor did they foresee the influence of the drama of live explosions carried world-wide. The drama raised tensions in America in February 1991.

On 25 February, when a SCUD landed on a American military barracks, the press raised questions of Patriot reliability, the worth of the war, and the effect of reserve call-ups, as most of the soldiers killed came from the same town in Pennsylvania. Briefers faced these questions in Riyadh and Washington as the networks juxtaposed these briefings with interviews of grieving parents. The actions taken to counter the SCUDS were mostly successful. The number of SCUDS launched decreased as the war went on, and the last SCUD that hit Israel, also on 25 February, had a concrete war head.⁴⁵

The effectiveness of the campaign against SCUDS raised questions, more serious questions were raised as a result of the air operation as a whole, especially in light of the bombing of the Baghdad bunker.

The final problem was reported in the Kansas City Star on 14 February 1991. American warplanes dropped two bombs on a bunker filled with civilians, "killing scores and perhaps hundreds...and setting off a battle for world opinion over the scope of the allied air war."⁴⁶ The resolution of this problem took place under the glare of media scrutiny.

Prior to 14 February 1991 the Bush administration was wrestling with the prospect of increasing civilian casualties and the impact of these deaths on US and world public support for the bombing operation. The intent of the bombing operation was to set conditions for victory and reduce allied casualties during the expected ground offensive. Rising civilian death tolls could pressure the premature launching of the ground attack. The spectre of enemy deaths influencing the conduct of the war came as a surprise. The bunker bombing gave Iraq a propaganda windfall it exploited quickly.⁴⁷

The TV reporting of the air campaign showed repeatedly the accuracy and precision of the bombs and missiles used by the allies. This demonstration of accuracy backfired as pictures of broken bodies in the

bunker attack, all clearly civilian, were removed from the wreckage. The US and Allied response was to try to suggest that the civilians were deliberately sacrificed, encouraged to use a military structure for shelter. The battle for public opinion from this event was overcome as the ground campaign was launched ten days later. The media reporting of enemy civilian deaths and its subsequent influence on the conduct of military operations was never really resolved.

The criteria applied to the events outlined show actions and reactions. The primary lesson gleaned from the analysis is that the reactions to public opinion were unplanned and caused an unanticipated diversion of resources from the primary objective. The CNN age produces an absolute requirement for operations and public affairs staffs. The two staffs must consider the impact of media reports about operations and the attainment of policy and military objectives prior to the execution of a campaign.

News media, whether communicated by telegraph, newspapers, or electronic video, is the primary source of information for most active people. The news media shapes opinions through the events they report, how the events are depicted, and the way images in the event are emphasized.⁴⁰ Bearing this in mind, operations and public affairs staff officers must include preventative

public affairs in the campaign plan, that is public affairs sequels with operations sequels, and public affairs branches with operations branches. Information objectives must be established for each part of the campaign with the same rigor as courses of action are developed by the operations staff. Based upon the analysis of the selected events the next portion of this monograph will present public affairs planning principles for war in the CNN age.

CONCLUSIONS

Don't pick a fight with a man that buy's ink by the barrel! ANON

As stated earlier, the Army role in sustaining public support focuses on building confidence in the force through preparation, anticipating information requirements, and establishing objectives for the campaign. The current guidance for operational level planning in the media age is strong in technique and procedure, and weak in setting forth planning principles to guide the establishment of a media campaign plan. The conclusion of the research done for this monograph is that there exists a public affairs gap in our doctrine. The doctrine, set forth primarily in Army regulation at the technique and procedure level, focuses on the functionary role of the public affairs officer. While

this is not bad, the exclusive focus on function without an operational and tactical doctrinal base makes the task of dismissing the PAO from the operational plan development very easy. The PAO must grow beyond the functionairre into the planner.

The analysis of the preceeding historical events suggests three principles for planning operations in the media age and an appropriate acronym: Preparation, Anticipation, and Objective [PAO].

Preparation, as a principle, covers the need for technique and procedure as well an information preparation of the theater. The preparation principle addresses the problem identification and resolution phases of the public relations model. The public affairs staff along with the operations staff must understand the steps needed to wage war in the media age. Study of the intended theater of operations provides information on culture, tradition, infrastructure, and existing media. Preparation identifies the need for a Joint Information Bureau, [JIB]. Preparation also identifies the unique needs of the JIB in theater; from satellite uplinks to transportation truck and helicopter companies.⁴⁹ [See also Annex 5 for an editorial on TTP] This principle also sets up the information required for use of the next principle, Anticipation.

Anticipation requires the operational and public

affairs planner to look at the enemy and visualize any action the enemy might take that would materially affect the policy objectives that started the campaign, and influence public opinion about the force. Anticipation in the development of information objectives implies the need for public affairs branches and sequels. This principle is related to the planning and execution steps of the public relations process. For example, the defense of Washington was a primary requirement for Grant. When Early threatened the city, Grant was forced to return elements of two corps to defend the city to keep public confidence, even knowing the threat to the city was a "mere foray." Grant knew action not words were necessary. The bombing operations during Desert Storm, coupled with the Iraqi control of CNN's access to bomb damage raised serious questions around the world about the morality of the bombing. Television shows the moral cost of war on civilians with more impact than print news. This influence of television will increase sensitivity to death tolls and innocents suffering which policy-makers must consider. The campaign planners must also anticipate the influence of the perception of unintended actions caused by bombing or even blockade on public opinion. Preparation and Anticipation directly support the last principle, Objective.

Objective is a principle of war. The meaning of

Objective expands in the media age. The planner must establish military objectives in support of the goals set by policy. The relation of the military objective to its policy goals must be clear in the images of war. The operational and public affairs planner must also establish information objectives that complement the sustainment of public support for the campaign. These objectives range from the nature of the missions assigned the force, to demonstrating the competence of the force committed to the action. The electronic media serve as a means of communicating the will of the committed forces and the policy-makers to the public and the enemy.

The information objectives cannot deceive or be perceived as a deception means. While the execution of a deception operation in the media age is beyond the scope of this monograph, the credibility of the military and the media depends upon factual reporting. Deception, in military terms, focuses on the enemy. The media may see deception operations as focusing on them under the guise of operational security. Yet, when the media reports facts and assumes an intent that is central to the deception operation, they do become one of the means of deception. This feature of war is unavoidable, and while it will bruise media egos, it should not damage credibility. This is a problem of semantics and education, but clearly must take into account the

principle of Objective. [See Annexes 2 & 3 for a media view of Deception.]

Military action, especially American military action, will receive even more media attention in the future. Knowing that the media will cover military actions, the commander plus his public affairs and operational planners must have guidelines or principles as aids to judgment. Campaign planning cannot be closed to the public affairs staff, with the rejoinder, "get us some good press." The commander must recognize that the actions of his force need to relate to his goals and must speak for themselves as a prerequisite. The public affairs staff must know the plan and "what" to say in support of campaign objectives as well as "how," [techniques and procedures] to say words that support the ends and explain actions. This requires the public affairs officer become more than a functionary media representative.

The commander defines the role of the PAO in the campaign. The operational level commander's PAO must operate in a greater role than that of press relations. The PAO must also provide feedback to the commander on the state of the press, the message the press transmits to the home-front, and how the message is received by the public. This requires the development of a media campaign plan.

The media campaign plan must include: clear media ground rules for their operations; acceptable access to units, recognition of the difference between media; e.g. home-town, weekly, daily, and national; knowledgeable briefing officers of senior rank, and goals related to the operational commander's intent for the campaign. Development of the media campaign plan requires both techniques and procedures amply set forth in current regulations, and planning principles.

Principles function as an aid to judgment, and, in the media age, are absolutely required when developing a media campaign plan. The public affairs planning principles: Preparation, Anticipation, and Objective are not new. The media age requires a new application of these time-proven principles, using them to refine the effort needed to wage war in the age of instant communication. A campaign cannot succeed without the sustained political support of the government and the people.⁵⁰ Doctrinal manuals need to incorporate these, or some principles like these in order to bring about greater awareness of the problems of waging war in the glare of klieg lights and forest of microphones.

Currently, while FM 101-5 and pertinent Army regulations state principles that guide technique, they do not stimulate thought or guide action. A new manual on public relations planning and procedure at the

operational level must clearly state principles in an effort to require PAO's to think and plan beyond mere technique and procedure. The PAO for an operational level commander must think in terms of military operations in the media age. Incorporation of planning principles in a new manual would give life to the most important mission listed for PAO's in FM 101-5, to advise and inform the commander about the public affairs impact inherent in combat operations. This impact was addressed in a New York Times column, written shortly after Desert Storm.

Walter Goodman, a New York Times columnist, wrote that how bad a war is depends on its images. His column reinforces the need for public affairs planning in accord with principles guiding action. Goodman points out that many Americans felt good about the war, but the mood was swayed by the direction the camera was pointed and the images the people were shown. Goodman concludes his essay with a proposed Clausewitzian doctrine for the video age:

When focused on distant pinpoint hits, military briefings, parades and enemy aggression, the camera can rally a spirit of combat. But when it turns toward the down and dirty consequences of war, it becomes the super weapon of pacifism. And like other weapons, it can be put to the service of defenders or aggressors, democrats or dictators.⁵¹

The task of the operational planner and the public affairs planner is to maintain the support of the people

through information objectives, even when the people are confronted with the "down and dirty consequences of war." Americans will support a fight when they believe in their Army, and that the Army is fighting and dying for a good cause with attainable goals. The influence of the media during a long war cannot be calculated, but must be reckoned with.

Bob Woodward captured the image of war in the media age in his book, "The Commanders." He relates a vignette of Desert Shield in which a reporter on ABC tells of poor morale and unhappy troops. Woodward points out that nothing of substance was offered, only opinion, but the reporter's story reinforced the fact that war would be on television instantly. Reporters and cameras would record and relay the war live to America. This extra dimension would, "vastly complicate all military tasks."⁵² War in the media age is won or lost on the battle field and on the air waves.

The operational planner as well as the public affairs planner must understand in advance the consequences of different types of actions as they are reported by the media to make news coverage part of the solution, not another problem. Planning principles as aids to judgment and written into doctrine will assist in this effort. Planning, Anticipation, and Objective are key principles that when applied to the operations

campaign and adjunct media campaign will ensure an appreciation of the media age's influence on war. The key to success is a mature understanding of the interrelationship of military and media.

Doctrine must address the media age. Doctrine must provide the guidance necessary to navigate in the media minefield. Since the media transmit a message of the campaign by their nature, the commander wants military and information objectives that relate reported activities to the success of the operation. Woodward underscores the importance of this understanding when he quotes GEN Powell. Powell said of war in the media age,

Once you've got all the forces moving and everything's being taken care of by the commanders, turn your attention to television because you can win the battle or lose the war if you don't handle the story right.⁵³

END NOTES

1

Comment made by my mother-in-law to my father-in-law the night the air operation of Desert Storm began. Like most Americans they got their news from television.

2

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Cutlip, p. 194. Figure 2 is also drawn from this source, page 200.

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Cutlip, p. 184.

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McPherson, p. 731.

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James M. Dubik, Grant's Final Campaign: A Study of Operational Art, unpublished monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, 1991, p. 32.

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McPherson, p. 732.

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Lecture, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, by Professor Herman Hattaway to the Advanced Military Studies Program students on 22 November 1991.

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Bob Woodward, The Commanders, [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991], p. 350.

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The preceeding paragraph was developed from articles in the Kansas City Star, Wall Street Journal, and Time magazine, all printed during the period from November 1990 to March 1991.

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James J. Schneider, Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art, unpublished theoretical paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, 1991, p. 37

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P.H. Sheridan, The Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan, vol. I, [New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1885], p. 459. [Hereafter cited as PHS]

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"US hits bunker, kills scores," The Kansas City Star, 14 February 1991, p. A-1.

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Andrew Rosenthal, "More Iraqi deaths threaten air war," The Kansas City Star, 14 February 1991, p. A-11, and Friedrich, pp. 55-56.

48

Cutlip, p. 152.

49

James McAvoy, "Tactics for the Military in the Media War," The Wall Street Journal, 7 February 1991, page unknown. This superb editorial elaborates four points for improving the information objectives and techniques used by DoD during the Gulf War and for future wars. Mr. McAvoy's advice needs to be incorporated into any PAO manual. The entire editorial is listed as Annex 5 of this monograph.

50

Dubik, pp. 31-32

51

Walter Goodman, "How Bad is War? Depends on the Images," The New York Times, 4 November 1991, page unknown. A superb article that frankly points out the hazards of fighting a modern war in the video equipped media age. It reinforces the thought attributed to GEN Powell by Woodward that a long war with high casualties would be almost impossible to prosecute, given the multitude of reporters and electronic media. Another tongue-in-cheek view of the war, journalists, and the military response to journalists is found in P.J. O'Rourke's book, Give War a Chance, especially his chapter, "Give War a Chance, Dispatches from the Gulf War." O'Rourke reinforces the real-time nature of the war and the influence of television vice print media. The book offers a rather biased but definitely thought-provoking look at we "military-types."

52

Woodward, p. 315.

53

Woodward, p. 155.

ANNEX 1

QUESTIONS POSED TO NEWSMEN CONCERNING MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONS

1. WHAT IS YOUR GENERAL OPINION ON MEDIA POOLS AND MEDIA POOL MANAGEMENT?

2. DO YOU THINK ASSIGNING A REPORTER TO A SPECIFIC UNIT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME OR THE DURATION OF AN OPERATION IS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO POOLS?

3. WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE:

A. THE ADVANTAGES OF A POOL SYSTEM, AND;

B. THE DISADVANTAGES?

4. HOW WOULD YOU IMPROVE THE POOL SYSTEM?

5. A VITAL PART OF ANY MILITARY OPERATION IS THE DECEPTION OPERATION. HOW SHOULD THE MEDIA PLAY A PART IN THIS OPERATION;

A. AN INFORMED ROLE, THAT IS UNDERSTANDING THE ENTIRE SCOPE OF THE INTENDED AND DECEPTION OPERATION,

OR;

B. UNINFORMED ROLE WITH MILITARY FOCUSED ACCESS?

6. IF YOU WERE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS WHAT SYSTEM WOULD YOU PROPOSE FOR MEDIA RELATIONS DURING PEACE AS WELL AS CRISIS?

7. SHOULD ONLY REPORTERS ACCREDITED TO OR THROUGH THE PENTAGON BE ALLOWED TO COVER WARS?

8. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR
ACCREDITATION SHOULD BE?

9. WHAT WAS YOUR BIGGEST "GRIPE" ABOUT MILITARY-
MEDIA RELATIONS DURING DESERT SHIELD/STORM, AND HOW WOULD
YOU RESOLVE IT?

ANNEX 2

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Vince Gibbens, TV Journalist, WITI-TV, Milwaukee, WI, 26December1991.

1. Mr. Gibbens is the news anchorman for WITI-TV in Milwaukee, WI. He covered the Gulf War for his TV station. He served in the military for seven years, through the Vietnam War, with Armed Forces Radio and Television Service.

2. Mr. Gibbens answered Questions 1,4,5, [See Annex 1], and freely gave his thoughts and opinions on the media, the military, and how to approach relations between the two.

a. Question 1. Mr. Gibbens rated the military handling of media pools a "5" on a scale of 1 to 10. The Joint Information Bureau [JIB] responded to the needs of the major networks; CNN, ABC, etc., and disregarded other electronic journalists. He believes the military missed the mark on this point. The major networks were/are interested in the "big picture" whereas Mr. Gibbens wanted to present stories of local interest; such as Wisconsin National Guard units in the desert, or the USS Wisconsin. Mr. Gibbens said, "The military missed an opportunity on impacting public support through the local TV news."

Mr. Gibbens also commented on the inability

of the JIB to deal with local TV stations access to high technology equal to the major networks. The next war will have even more local stations trying to cover local units with the ability to, "go live."

b. Question 4. Mr. Gibbens said pools are important and manageable. His problem with the pools was pools included only the "big people," [CNN, NY Times, etc.], and maybe some add-ons. The basic rules of the pool were good; all copy was available to everyone.

c. Question 5. Mr. Gibbens prefaced his answer with the following:

Do not make me a part of the deception plan by telling me about it. That puts me in an untenable position as a reporter.

Mr. Gibbens view was it is better to focus media coverage on what we, the military, want covered than include some or all of the press in the details of a deception effort. The price the military and the media pays is too great. The press never knows what to believe and the military loses credibility.

3. Mr. Gibbens major "gripe" was the, "military paranoia against showing Americans hurt or killed on TV." Mr. Gibbens believes that in the media age the government must make the justification for sacrifice realistically and in advance. The media will not show exceedingly gory footage. Mr. Gibbens told me he was accompanied by an

"overzealous" PAO everywhere he went. This presence put a damper on any potential interviewee. Mr. Gibbens said the reality of the situation came home as he filmed and observed American soldiers performing their tasks in MOPP IV. He said he suddenly realized if he broke the media rules on disclosing locations he would also be in the line of fire. This, he believes, is the ultimate self motivation for good sense on the part of the reporter. The rules for media during any war must be explained in advance and have a basis in necessity.

ANNEX 3

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. David Hendrickson, Reporter, The Milwaukee Journal, 26December1991.

1. Mr. Hendrickson covered the Gulf War as a member of one of the original pools. He served in the Army from 1974-1977. He covered the war for The Milwaukee Journal, a major Mid-west regional newspaper. He served as a member of a panel at the Defense Information Officers School after the war.

2. I had a wide ranging discussion with Mr. Hendrickson. He very freely gave his opinions and concerns, motivated by a desire to be a better reporter and have better relations with the military. He reminded me that reporters serve two masters; the truth [although why only the media can discern the "truth" he could not say], and the editors of the paper they write for as a newspaper is also a business. The initial conversation covered many topics, later during the discussion I asked and he answered my direct questions from Annex 1.

3. Mr. Hendrickson characterized the reporters' conflict as the conflict between a "Halberstam or a Pyle." He said his own conflict was the desire to see the US win the gulf war and be supportive of the American soldier while maintaining a jaded eye toward "official sources." He said his own stories in the Journal showed

how well American soldiers overcame the problems of living in the desert and the logistical work it took to supply the large American force. Based upon this personal view of the large logistical effort, he could not accept logistical arguments, specifically the lack of transportation, as a valid reason to limit reporters access to soldiers and "the news." In his words, "It was EASY to move 500,000 soldiers to the Gulf, but 1400 reporters was a PROBLEM?"

4. Mr. Hendrickson dealt with the Joint Information Bureau, [JIB]. His view of the JIB was the JIB wanted a PAO with every reporter and that was impossible. Mr. Hendrickson had no problem with the review of his copy and sharing his copy with others that did not get to go to the field with the pool. He stated very clearly that he did not go to the Gulf to be a security risk. His major misunderstanding with the JIB was the basis for the ground rules were never explained. He felt very strongly that print journalists were hurt by the rules intended more properly for the electronic media. The limit on the pools was aimed, in his view, at limiting the potential damage caused by the immediacy of the electronic media. A delay does not hurt print journalists. The print journalist must write a story that is too early for history but too late to be a "scoop." Mr. Hendrickson really felt that a distinction

should be made between the medium the different media uses and different rules applied to these groups. As a final comment he said despite protestations to the contrary, the military person does not exist that can deal equally with "celebrity" reporters. In his experience, "when Sam Donaldson showed up, noone else could get near the JIB."

5. Question 5. Mr. Hendrickson believes the press was deceived during the operation, by that he means deliberately lied to by JIB. The military controlled access to soldiers and shaped coverage by placing the pools in locations to enhance the deception effort of the overall campaign. He feels that the military is on dangerous grounds when using the press as a part of the deception campaign. The root of the problem here is, I believe, the semantics. Deception is a legitimate military operation to a military mind and does not mean lying to the press rather misleading the opponent. The press understand deception as lying to them on purpose. It will take a great deal of dialogue and education effort to make this point clear.

6. Question 6. Mr. Hendrickson believes the pool system must go or at least comply with the original intent of the system; a temporary arrangement until a structure was in place to deal with the media. He stated a definite time should be established for pool shut down.

As a fix to the problem of pools he offered these thoughts:

a. It is not a military problem to protect reporters, they should take their chances.

b. Reporters, print reporters, should get free access to select where they want to go.

c. Reports made from the field must go to the JIB where, if there is a problem with the story-and these problems would only be security breaches-the JIB would explain the problem and let the reporter correct it. If a reporter sent a compromising story reviewers in the US would catch it and the credentials of the reporter pulled.

d. TV is in a different world therefore establish different rules for that medium. A PAO escort ought to accompany TV pools or crews to ensure the background of the shots does not give away a location through changes in terrain. The PAO assesses the immediate impact on operational security.

7. Question 7 & 8. The short answer was NO! Hendrickson recommended that DoD publish a cheap, concise "this is the military" reference book for reporters that do not know anything about the military. His point is good, the military is better off informing people about itself than saying, "you can't play." He did propose that DoD offer a "stamp of approval" for reporters that

wanted to go to a theater of war. This he said would enhance the credibility of reporters and cut down on some of the freelance writers.

8. As final comments Mr. Hendrickson offered these thoughts.

a. "One false answer turns the tamest reporter into a bulldog." The best policy is never lie to a reporter, when you cannot or will not answer a question say so.

b. Next time, improve access. Access is everything to reporters. Soldiers equal the story.

c. In a very perceptive comment, Mr. Hendrickson realized the regular Army tie to the Guard and Reserve means local news organizations will demand access to "hometown" units. The root of public support is in the hometowns of not only these units but the regulars too.

ANNEX 4

SUBJECT: Memorandum of telephone conversation with Representative Les Aspin, Chairman House Armed Services Committee, 29December1991.

1. Through the offices of my father I as able to speak with Les Aspin about my topic for an operational level monograph. REP Aspin called my father's home on 29 December 1991.

2. Mr. Aspin stated that the media, public relations, and public perceptions are major parts in the question of whether we, the US, go to war and sustain the effort. In the world now public support for war if the nation was actually threatened would not be a problem. The question is in the world now, "the nation itself may not be threatened but our interests will be challenged. Will the public support the use of force if our interests are challenged is the real question." Mr. Aspin said the Army was absolutely right to include a chapter on public support/communication in FM 100-5.

3. Mr. Aspin said that because we live in a video age American wars cannot cause too many American casualties and take too long. Public support will wither if either condition is not met.

4. Mr. Aspin also said that just war arguments only come up when interests are threatened, not when national survival is at stake.

ANNEX 5

SUBJECT: WALL STREET JOURNAL EDITORIAL BY MR.

JAMES MCAVOY, 7 FEBRUARY 1991.

Tactics for the Military in the Media War

By JAMES MCAVOY

The media are irate over the military's "managing" coverage of the Persian Gulf conflict. During the past few weeks, stories on the "military's restrictive coverage" have abounded. But I would argue that the military has not exerted enough control.

In the public relations business we have learned how to work with the media to protect our clients' interests without compromising the public's need to know. We help corporations, interest groups and foreign governments communicate their story to the public. We must argue our side as forcefully as possible and trust the news media will search out the opposing view. We are rarely disappointed.

The media have no right to expect the military to do more than present its own side as factually and forcefully as it can.

The military's performance so far sets a standard for openness most corporations should have problems matching. As someone who has advised corporations during labor unrest and hostile takeovers, it is obvious to me that the military is making an effort at cooperating with the media. But some independent, outside coaching could improve performance.

• *One source of information.* A corporation never would face a crisis with the CEO issuing statements from headquarters and the divisional presidents briefing the national press from the local level. The military must stop holding briefings both at the Pentagon and in Riyadh. The contradictions are mounting and their credibility is falling. There have been contradictions on the number of Marines killed in the first ground action. The number of Scud missile launchers destroyed was first set at one number in Riyadh only to be reset at another number at the Pentagon. If heavy ground action begins, these contradictions will grow even more common.

The solution is one briefing origin:

in either place linked via satellite to the other. This is a public relations tactic corporations use to ensure uniformity in their comments to the media.

• *Tell them why you can't tell them.* In response to some questions, military spokesmen have avoided direct statements, saying that to answer would reveal "operational details" or threaten "operational security." The media are tired of this non-answer. The military must make a strenuous effort to explain why those questions cannot be answered.

A reporter recently grew angry at a briefer in Riyadh who would not comment on the weather conditions over Baghdad. The reporter pointed out that the Iraqis could "look out the window" to see the weather, so it obviously was not a military secret. The briefer shrugged off the question. A more productive approach would have been to respond that telling the Iraqis our forecast would only help them determine the accuracy of our forecasts. The briefer could also explain that to say the weather is clear is tantamount to announcing an impending air attack.

• *Accept the move to the front.* The military has denied all requests to move live coverage to the front. All ground action we have seen so far is from videotape shot and rushed back to a satellite uplink. If our ground troops start to move into Kuwait, there will be attempts to report live from the front with or without military approval.

Already, the attempt by CBS's Bob Simon to get unique coverage near the border resulted in the disappearance of him and his crew. The military needs an approach that points out and reinforces the danger involved, for the reporters' own safety and the military's interests.

First the stick: If a network sends a crew to the front without a military escort there should be a reduction in that

network's access to satellite time and elimination of satellite access if there are more incidents. The Israelis took a hard line with NBC when security guidelines were violated; the Pentagon needs to be just as strict. Then the carrot: The military needs to send a satellite truck to the front and offer its own feed. It won't make the networks perfectly happy, but it will make it harder for them to complain.

Does anyone doubt that showing a single engagement in a battlefield that spans hundreds of miles would inaccurately portray the war? Yet, unless the military finds ways to feed the news media enough controlled access to the front, this is exactly what will happen.

• *Ration the visuals.* The videotape of bombing missions the military has offered so far is spectacular, but the number of times these inside glimpses are provided should be limited. Reporters will be impressed only so many times.

There are at least three "watershed" events that could dramatically affect news coverage of the conflict: ground troops moving into Kuwait, chemical weapons use by Iraq, and the coalition occupying Kuwait City. It would be wise to save the "action" video for these events.

The military also has failed to use another visual effectively: that of "live heroes." The airmen who rescued a downed pilot in Iraq were interviewed on a tarmac for 30 seconds. Reporters will appreciate interviewing these people in the briefing room at greater length.

As the media environment changes, the military will have to be more innovative to ensure its side of the story isn't overwhelmed by the observations of the media. Unless the military changes how it handles the press, the odds of meeting that goal are 50-50 at best.

Mr. McAvoy is executive vice president of Ruder Finn in Washington.

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